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Abstract 
Child labor is widespread in developing countries, but its causes are debatable.  
Poverty is considered the primary reason, but many theoretical and empirical analyses 
show that other factors, such as lack of access to credit, poor school quality, and labor 
market opportunities play equal or even greater roles in the decision to have children 
work.  This study surveys the existing literature and, taking into account urban-rural 
divides, aims to shed light on the debate with empirical evidence from Nepal, Peru, and 
Zimbabwe.  We find that while poverty drives child work and schooling in rural areas, it 
does not appear to significantly influence such decisions in urban areas.  This suggests 
that policies such as trade sanctions or a ban on child labor in rural areas could have an 
adverse effect as child labor decisions in such areas are more likely a response to poverty 
and subsistence requirements.  Similarly, improving access to credit has greater potential 
for alleviating child labor and enhancing school enrollment in rural than urban areas, 
particularly in Nepal and Zimbabwe.  On the other hand, the availability of alternative 
childcare options appears to considerably decrease child labor and create conditions for 
higher school attendance rates in urban than in rural areas.  Finally, evidence from all 
three countries indicates that efforts to bolster adult educational levels and wages will 
help curb the prevalence and intensity of child labor and improve the likelihood that 
children stay in school. 
 iii
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1. Introduction 
It is universally accepted that the rate of economic growth depends crucially on 
the stock of human capital in a country (Romer 1987; Lucas 1988; Barro 1991; Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil 1992).  The process of building capabilities to reduce poverty and 
vulnerability thus should involve enhancement of individual and household human 
capital assets.  A low level of human capital development has been long identified as a 
major impediment to economic growth and the elimination of poverty in developing 
countries.  Several studies (e.g., Vijverberg 1993; Glick and Sahn 2000) find high returns 
in the labor markets for investments in education for both men and women.  Glick and 
Sahn (1997) show that the earnings of women and men increase with schooling in both 
self-employment and wage employment by using data from a developing country.  
Similarly, other studies have consistently shown that child education has higher returns 
than other physical assets (e.g., Psacharopoulos 1994).  Despite these apparent benefits 
and high potential returns to education, the level of education and educational attainment 
remain remarkably low in most developing countries, and child labor participation, 
considered to be a competing activity to schooling, continues to be a common 
phenomenon. 
Child labor is widespread in developing countries.  Estimates by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO 1996) of the number of children under age 15 who work ranges 
from 100 to 200 million.  UNICEF (1991) estimated that there were 80 million children 
ages 1014 who undertook work so long or arduous that it interfered with their normal 
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development.  Though many, including parents themselves, agree that childhood is a 
period of school learning and physical and mental developmentand not of primarily 
income-generating workmany young children in low-income countries participate in 
the labor force, and their chance of receiving even primary education is minimal.  How 
do parents decide whether to send their children to school, and how do they calculate the 
costs of not doing so?1 
The causes of child labor are debatable, although poverty is considered as the 
primary reason.  That there is a higher geographic concentration of child workers in poor 
countries (see Basu 1999) indicates the inverse association of child labor and income.  
Basu and Van (1998) argue that the mass phenomenon of child labor does not reflect the 
selfishness of parents wanting to enjoy more leisure time while their children work, but 
rather that stark poverty and household survival compels them to send their children to 
work.  For poor households, school investment decisions are associated with a host of 
decisions regarding use of time and other resources of various household members.  
Changes in household circumstances, such as becoming poor, may elicit important time-
use changes, not only of children who are students or potential students, but of parents as 
well.  In developing countries, often more than one member of the household generates 
income (e.g., Ersado 2002 on Zimbabwe; Pradhan and van Soest 1997 on Bolivia), which 
often necessitates the use of child labor.  Several studies that looked at schooling 
determinants in developing countries find that household wealth does figure 
                                                 
1 These costs include perpetuating the vicious circle of poverty and vulnerability and extending it from the 
current generation to the next. 
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predominantly in child schooling and work decisions (e.g., Basu and Van 1998).  
Bhalotra (2000a) finds that in Pakistan child work is caused by poverty. 
Studies, citing evidence mainly from Latin America, argue that the rates of child 
labor are higher at times when children have better work opportunities as measured by 
local labor market conditions (Levison, Moe, and Knaul 2001; Binder 1999).  Since the 
seminal paper by Becker (1964), many development researchers have recognized the 
importance of opportunity costs in schooling decisions.  The opportunity costs of 
schooling increases as market wages for child labor increase.  Furthermore, differences in 
labor market conditions by gender may differentially affect the schooling decision for 
boys and girls. 
Still others argue that factors such as credit market imperfection, not poverty, play 
a role in sending children to work or keeping them at home to take care of domestic 
household responsibilities, even though returns on education (which accrue in the future) 
are higher.2  Cross-sectional data from India and other developing countries show that a 
higher incidence of poverty is not correlated with a higher incidence of child labor (e.g., 
Swaminathan 1998).  The Becker model and more recently Ranjan (2001) imply that 
income does not matter if complete credit markets exist.  A study by Jacoby (1994) finds 
that borrowing constraints negatively affect childrens schooling attainment in Peru.  
Studies also exist that highlight the child labor decision as part of households risk-
management strategy (Mendelievich 1979; Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Grootaert and 
                                                 
2 Ranjan (1999), using a two-period overlapping generation model, shows that credit constraints, not 
poverty, play a role in a households decision to use child labor instead of sending their children to school. 
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Kanbur 1995).  Households need to minimize the impact of shocks such as job losses and 
failed harvest on their income.  Lack of access to credit for smoothing income 
fluctuations over time might, therefore, lead to a higher prevalence of child labor.  Jacoby 
and Skoufias (1994) used a measure of variability of household income in rural India and 
found that when variability increased, school attendance declined. 
Lack of access to school and low school quality could also affect child schooling 
and work decisions.  For households rationally maximizing their welfare, low demand for 
schooling might arise because of low quality or excessive costs.  Inaccessibility of 
schools or their poor quality thus may spur parents to engage their children in more 
immediate and profitable pursuits (e.g., Grootaert and Patrinos 1999).  Schooling costs
since schooling is the main competing time use for childrencould also be an important 
determinant of the likelihood of child work (e.g., Siddiqi and Patrinos 1995).  Some 
children may have to work to afford the direct costs of schooling.  Even with sufficient 
access to school, child labor may still continue to be a common phenomenon if the 
household decisionmaking process gives more weight to income from childrens labor 
and less weight to childrens schooling because of unequal distributions of wealth among 
households (Grootaert and Kanbur 1995) or other cultural, environmental, and 
unobservable factors. 
While labor is the poors greatest asset, child labor raises important concerns.  A 
households decision to increase the number of family members in the labor market 
implies that mothers might have to give up vital household and childcare activities, and 
children might have to sacrifice their education in order to participate in income 
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generating activities.  When the poor depend on their childrens labor rather than invest 
in their future by educating them, they risk perpetuating poverty from one generation to 
the next (Moser 1996).  It is important to understand the trade-offs that households make 
between child labor-market participation and other vital time allocation decisions such as 
schooling and household work.  Such understanding will improve the design of 
development programs and policies to reduce poverty. 
The evidence briefly summarized here shows a lack of consensus on the causes of 
child labor and suggests that its determinants may vary across geographic regions.  It also 
casts doubt on the notion that child labor is primarily determined by poverty.  This paper, 
using household survey data from three geographic regions (Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America), investigates the factors driving child labor by collecting cross-country 
evidence on labor force participation and child education-related decisions important for 
development policy.  It also examines urban-rural differences in child labor and 
schooling decisions by emphasizing differences in livelihood strategies and approaches in 
urban and rural areas. 
This paper specifically asks questions such as: Does child labor mainly arise as a 
response to low income, lack of access to credit, an improved labor market, or poor 
school quality?  What affects the level of participation in the labor force once the 
decision to participate has been made?  Are there differences in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
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Latin America, and Southeast Asia?  Are urban-rural differences important?3  Empirical 
models that simultaneously consider labor participation and schooling decisions and the 
level of participation once such decisions are made while taking into account the 
potential differences in urban and rural areas are scant in development literature.  Yet 
these factors are of paramount importance to targeted policy and program designs to 
address poverty.  The paper empirically investigates these questions using nationally 
representative data from urban and rural areas of three developing countries in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. 
 
2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
The conventional welfare economics approach provides a useful framework for 
integrating determinants of child labor and schooling decisions.  The starting point is the 
household decisionmaking process for allocating childrens time between labor and 
nonlabor activities such as schooling and leisure, taking into account the private returns 
to each.  There are two main household decisionmaking models.  In unitary neoclassical 
household labor supply models, the family is assumed to make a joint decision regarding 
household consumption and labor supply of its members.  The decision is guided by 
utility maximization determined by household consumption and leisure of household 
members, under household budgetary constraints.  More recently, collective models, 
                                                 
3 Unlike their rural counterparts, who directly produce for their consumption needs and depend on the 
surrounding natural resources, most urban households depend on wage employment for income, markets 
for food supply and other livelihood needs, affordable social services, and government services for family 
safety nets.  Such differences may well be reflected in child labor and schooling decisions. 
7 
whereby the decisions and the outcomes in the household are results of a bargaining 
process among members, have received considerable attention.4  
The latter models require information on what happens within the household and 
the knowledge of bargaining-power share structure among household members.  To date 
these models are commonly applied to husbands and wives.  This paper confines itself to 
the case in which child labor and schooling decisions are an outcome of a unitary 
household decisionmaking process.  A unitary model appears relevant in the case since 
decisions about child labor-force participation and hours of work, leisure, and schooling 
are typically made by an adult, not by children themselves (Ray 2000b; Bhalotra 2000b).5 
Assume first that a representative household is composed of one parent and one 
child.6  Further assume that the household maximizes a two period (t) utility function: 
 ),,,,( ,,, ttctctptt XSLLCUV = , (1) 
where U is a well defined concave utility function over joint consumption (C), child 
schooling (Sc),7 parent, and child leisure times (Lp, Lc), and a vector of individual and 
household characteristics (X).  In the first period, the parent decides whether to send his 
child to school or work.  If the decision to send the child to school is made, the 
decisionmaker decides how much schooling the child will get through a household time 
                                                 
4 See, Alderman et al. (1995) for a good description of the collective model of household decisionmaking. 
5 However, the gender of household head is included as well as male and female wages and educational 
levels separately in the empirical estimation.  This will help account for potential differences in preferences 
between father and mother over child labor and schooling choices. 
6 Households with more members can be considered without loss of generality. 
7 Including child schooling in the parents utility function assumes that education is both an investment and 
consumption good for parents (Becker and Lewis 1973). 
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allocation process.  Assume that the parent decides to send his child to work in the first 
period; the child earns wage Wc (a child wage) in the first period and Wu (unskilled adult 
wage) in the second period.  If the parent instead decides to send his child to school, the 
child earns 0 wage in the first period and a Ws (a skilled adult wage) in the second period. 
It is safe to assume that Wc ≤ Wu ≤ Ws.  
Thus, the households total resources depend on the parents decision to send the 
child to work or to school in period t.  In period t + 1, the consumption and leisure of the 
child depends on childs wage (whether it is Wu or Ws), which in turn depends on whether 
the child is educated or not and the amount of time spent on schooling (Sc).  The goal of 
the household decisionmaker, then, is to maximize utility at equation (1), subject to time, 
and these resource constraints at each period: 
 TWSLLWC tttctctptt +Ω=+++ )( ,,, , (2) 
where Wt is a vector of wage rates for parent and child; T is total time available for the 
household (i.e., T = Tp + Tc, where Tp and Tc are total parent and child time, respectively); 
Ωt is nonwage income, and the price of joint consumption, Ct, is assumed as the 
numeraire.  This is a standard budget constraint where the left-hand sides are the outlays 
and the right-hand sides constitute the various income sources.  Note that Ωt includes 
profits from self-employment in farm and nonfarm activities (Π), interest income from 
household assets (At), transfers, and from all other incomes nonlabor sources: 
 tttt YA ++Π=Ω δ  (3) 
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where δ is the interest rate and Yt comprises all other nonlabor income. 
In addition to equation (2), the household decisionmaker is subject to a child-time 
constraint.  In a typical developing country, child time may be allocated to three broad 
activitiesschooling, paid labor, and leisure, including unpaid household domestic work: 
 tctctcc ESLT ,,, ++= , (4) 
where Ec,t is child time spent working on wage- and nonwage-earning employment. 
Since child schooling and work decisions have intertemporal implications for the 
household, consider an intertemporal version of the budget constraint in equation (2). 
Following Bahlotra (2000a), the time path of household assets (A) can be defined as 
follows: 
 })({)1( ,,1 ttppttcttttt CLTWEWYAA −−+++Π++=+ δ , (5) 
where At is total asset holding at the initial period; and the second term on the right-hand 
side accounts for savings (dissavings, if negative) from period t income after that periods 
consumption.  Using equations (2)(5) and solving for Ωt, we have 
 ttppttcttttt ALTWEWCAA ∆≡−+−+−=Ω + ))}(({)( ,,1  . (6) 
Equation (6) implies that an intertemporally consistent measure of nonwage income 
amounts to asset accumulation or de-cumulation, which allows agents to save or dissave 
(Bhalotra 2000a).  This measure of nonwage income, which basically excludes income 
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generated by children by virtue of its definition and the fact that child income is generally 
assumed to originate from wages, could be used as a exogenous poverty measure in the 
estimation of child schooling and work decisions.8 
Now assume the decisionmaker maximizes household welfare, equation (1), 
subject to a budgetary constraint, equation (6), and child time-constraints, equation (4), 
which mainly constitute time allocation decisions.  Maximizing household welfare 
subject to budgetary and time constraints implies that a parents decision on child 
schooling or work depends on the market price for composite consumption good 
(assumed as numeraire); wage rates for child, unskilled, and skilled labor; household 
asset holding; and nonwage income. 
Other factors, denoted by vector X in the utility function, such as perception of the 
value of education, accessibility of and expenses for school, the governments education 
policy, and the availability of educational infrastructure, play a role in schooling 
decisions.  Family characteristics, such as whether the parent is a father, could also play a 
role in such decisions.  Many studies observe that mothers tend to give greater weight to 
child education than do fathers (e.g., Kassouf 1998).  Following Beckers (1964) theory 
that parents invest in childrens schooling up to the point where marginal costs equal 
marginal benefits, the opportunity cost of schooling, which is reflected by the going wage 
rate for childrens labor (Wc), the expected return on education (Ws), and uneducated 
adult labor (Wu), will affect the amount of time parents allow children to spend at school. 
                                                 
8 In the empirical section, potential endogeneity of nonwage income is tested.  Presented results are based 
on using it and its valid instrument (i.e., direct measure of household asset ownership). 
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Taking these into account, an indirect utility function of a household under child 
schooling alone, schooling and work, and work alone decisions can be constructed.  An 
indirect utility function represents the maximum utility a household receives, conditioned 
on the choices it makes.  To construct one, first consider that the household maximizes 
equation (1), subject to equations (4) and (6) by allocating child time for schooling, work, 
or both.  Solving this problem would lead to a vector of optimal choices that are functions 
of prices, wages, household characteristics, income, credit constraints, and other factors, 
 ),,,,,(* ΨΠΓ ttttt XYAW , (7) 
where Ψ constitutes all community-level observed and unobserved characteristics that 
likely affect the parents decision on child schooling and work such as credit 
opportunities, accessibility to school, school fees, and other factors.  The indirect utility 
function is now obtained by substituting the vector of choices in equation (6) into the 
utility function in equation (1) to define the maximum utility households receive once 
decisions are made optimally, 
 )),,,,,(*U( ΨΠΓ= ttttt XYAWV . (8) 
Schooling is a form of human capital enhancement, so an indirect utility function under 
schooling decision can be defined as 
 )),,,,,(*( ΨΠΓ= ttttss XYAWUV . (9) 
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Parents decide to send children to school instead of work at time t if they are better off 
with the enhanced human capital, i.e., if and only if 
 0≥− us VV , (10) 
where Vu is the indirect utility under the no child schooling decision,  
 )),,,,,(*( ΨΠΓ= ttttuu XYAWUV . (11) 
 
3.  Data 
Data from Nepal, Peru, and Zimbabwe provide the key determinants of child 
labor participation and schooling decisions, focusing on the similarities and differences 
between the results of urban and rural areas from these countries.  Data from three 
countries are used to examine child schooling and work decisions across three developing 
continents.  Since the structure and the coverage of the data sets are nationally 
representative, reasonable comparisons can be made.  In line with the objectives of the 
paper, results based on more than one country will help solidify or weaken the 
presumption that poverty drives child labor.  Furthermore, this approach disaggregates 
households into urban and rural sectors to examine whether and how child work and 
schooling decisions differ by area of residence. 
The data are from the 1990/91 Zimbabwe Income Expenditure Consumption 
Survey (ZICES), the 1994 Peru Living Standards Measurement Survey (PLSS), and the 
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1995 Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS).  The respective governments and the 
World Bank conducted the PLSS and NLSS surveys jointly as part of the LSMS carried 
out in a number of developing countries, while the Central Statistical Office of Zimbabwe 
was responsible for conducting the ZICES.9  These three surveys are nationally 
representative, lending themselves for comparison on individual-, household-, and 
community-level characteristics.  The PLSS covers about 3,623 households; the NPLSS, 
3,373 households; and the ZICES, over 14,000 households.  The Nepal and Zimbabwe 
surveys report child schooling and employment data for 3,617 and 15,467 children ages 
1017, respectively.  The Peru sample contains child labor and child schooling 
information for 5,191 children ages 617.10  These large-scale household surveys provide 
information about children who work or do not work and those who attend or do not 
attend school, thus providing a model of child labor and schooling decisions. 
Before discussing the descriptive results, it is important to describe how child 
labor supply is measured.  The measurement of child labor depends on how it is defined 
and by ethical and cultural views.  For some, all non-school, nonleisure activities of 
children constitute child labor.  Others define it only as only full-time employment in 
economic activities or as bad child labor such as backbreaking work in quarries or 
mines.  This paper defines child labor as hours in both wage and nonwage activities, as 
                                                 
9 There was access to both the1990/91 and 1995/96 Zimbabwe ICES data.  The pre-drought and structural 
adjustment data, the 1990/91 ZICES, is used for this paper, since it is a better representation of normal 
times in Zimbabwe than the data following the economic instability due to drought and structural changes 
in the early 1990s (see Alwang, Ersado, and Taruvinga 2001 and Ersado, Alderman, and Alwang 2002).  
This will improve the comparability among the three countries and their respective data sets. 
10 To facilitate comparison among countries, only Peruvian children ages 1017 (about 3,599 children) are 
considered in this paper. 
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reported by these multipurpose, countrywide household surveys that are used to make up 
the child labor supply variable.  This is in line with Skoufias and Parker (2002), who 
argue that such a broad measure provides a more accurate estimate of the household 
preferences toward leisure.  Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) also claim that relying on 
hours of wage work only is likely to yield estimates that reflect substitution away from 
work at home as well as leisure. 
 
Child Schooling and Employment Distribution by Age 
Tables 13 show child employment participation and school enrollment rates for 
Nepal, Peru, and Zimbabwe by age, sex, and location.  While nearly all children in Peru 
and Zimbabwe appear to be enrolled in school, about a quarter of Nepalese children have 
never been to school.  For all age groups, current school attendance rates are lowest in 
Nepal (64 percent), followed by Zimbabwe (86 percent) and Peru (92 percent).  Lower 
enrollment rates for Nepalese children may reflect a lack of access to good schools, but 
those enrolled appear to stay in school more than both Zimbabwean and Peruvian 
children. 
The data from all countries show lower enrollment and higher employment rates 
in rural areas compared to urban areas.  Disaggregating by age and sex shows that 
enrollment rate difference by gender grows wider with age in Zimbabwe than in either 
Peru or Nepal.  Most of the decrease in enrollment rates for older age groups in 
Zimbabwe is due to more girls dropping out of schools than boys.  While this is the case  
15 
Table 1Enrollment and employment rates among Nepalese children in 1995/96 
 Enrollment  Employment 
 Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Age Male Female Total  Male Female Total  Male Female Total  Male Female Total 
                
10 85.7 79.2 82.6  77.7 52.8 65.3  7.1 13.2 10.1  20.6 31.6 26.1 
11 86.8 87.9 87.3  78.3 64.3 71.0  5.3 0.0 2.8  26.8 34.5 30.8 
12 85.9 77.3 82.4  71.4 48.5 61.1  12.5 15.9 13.9  38.5 48.5 43.0 
13 85.1 71.8 79.1  75.2 50.3 64.5  17.0 20.5 18.6  40.2 49.7 44.3 
14 80.7 69.1 75.0  64.8 46.4 54.8  19.3 18.2 18.8  50.6 53.1 52.0 
15 79.6 75.5 77.6  56.1 35.5 46.5  24.5 18.4 21.4  55.6 66.3 60.6 
16 54.2 73.3 63.4  49.5 34.3 42.1  33.3 26.7 30.1  58.7 63.2 60.9 
17 73.8 65.8 70.0  42.4 33.3 37.9  31.0 18.4 25.0  59.7 66.7 63.2 
Total 79.3 74.7 77.1  65.5 46.1 56.1  18.5 16.9 17.7  42.9 50.8 46.7 
 
Table 2Enrollment and employment rates among Peruvian children in 1994 
 Enrollment  Employment 
 Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Age Male Female Total  Male Female Total  Male Female Total  Male Female Total 
                
10 96.8 95.7 96.3  94.7 91.2 92.8  9.5 6.0 7.8  55.8 35.4 44.7 
11 99.3 96.6 98.1  94.4 90.7 92.4  12.5 8.5 10.7  62.2 37.4 48.7 
12 96.9 96.3 96.6  88.6 91.3 90.0  10.9 8.9 9.8  71.4 48.1 59.8 
13 97.1 91.0 93.9  89.7 80.4 84.7  14.0 11.1 12.5  61.5 50.0 55.3 
14 95.6 91.3 93.3  75.0 78.3 76.5  26.3 14.3 19.8  76.0 62.7 69.9 
15 88.8 85.2 87.0  78.2 67.1 72.5  31.3 14.1 22.7  78.2 61.0 69.4 
16 84.9 77.1 81.1  71.4 58.1 63.8  29.5 18.6 24.1  89.3 59.5 72.3 
17 61.2 59.6 60.8  60.0 37.7 49.0  39.3 16.3 27.0  82.5 44.2 63.7 
Total 91.9 88.3 90.1  84.5 82.4 83.4  15.1 9.2 12.1  56.6 40.1 48.0 
 
Table 3Enrollment and employment rates among Zimbabwean children in 
1990/91 
 Enrollment  Employment 
 Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Age Male Female Total  Male Female Total  Male Female Total  Male Female Total 
                
10 98.4 99.3 98.9  95.7 95.6 95.7  0.4 1.1 0.8  3.0 2.6 2.8 
11 98.7 98.6 98.6  95.1 96.4 95.8  0.9 0.0 0.5  3.1 2.7 2.9 
12 99.0 96.5 97.8  94.6 93.5 94.0  0.5 1.5 1.0  5.1 4.4 4.8 
13 97.5 98.6 98.1  92.1 91.6 91.8  1.0 1.4 1.2  4.9 6.5 5.7 
14 94.8 91.0 92.6  89.7 83.3 86.7  1.1 5.6 3.7  7.9 13.5 10.5 
15 97.0 78.6 87.5  81.9 67.4 75.1  1.5 14.1 8.0  13.9 24.5 18.8 
16 88.9 70.9 78.5  76.0 60.3 68.4  2.4 18.4 11.6  17.4 32.6 24.7 
17 75.8 54.1 64.2  64.8 51.3 58.5  3.2 25.5 15.1  27.4 39.7 33.1 
Total 93.9 85.4 89.4  87.1 82.0 84.6  1.3 8.8 5.3  9.7 14.1 11.8 
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for both urban and rural areas in Zimbabwe, rural areas of Peru and Nepal show the 
biggest disparity in enrollment rates between boys and girls.  This evidence is indicative 
of more favor for schooling of boys than girls in rural areas, while school enrollment 
rates in urban areas do not appear to show a significant gender bias. 
On the other hand, child employment rates go in an opposite direction to 
enrollment, possibly suggesting that dropping out of school is at least partly driven by 
employment decisions.  In all countries, labor force participation grows with age.  In 
urban areas overall, employment rates are higher for boys than for girls in Peru and 
higher for girls than for boys in Zimbabwe.  In rural areas, female employment rates 
appear to be higher than they are for boys in Zimbabwe, while the opposite is the case in 
Peru.  For all age groups and in both urban and rural areas, child employment rates are 
highest in Peru, closely followed by Nepal, and the lowest in Zimbabwe.  This is 
particularly true in rural areas:  while nearly half of Peruvian and Nepalese children are 
engaged in some kind of employment activity, less than 12 percent of Zimbabwean 
children claim to be so.  It will be of great interest to see what household, community, 
and regional characteristics determine employment and schooling decisions in these 
countries.  
 
Child Time Allocation by Residence and Sex 
Table 4 presents child time allocation to schooling, employment, or both, by 
residence and gender.  A large proportion of Peruvian children undertake both schooling 
and employment activities simultaneously.  Interestingly, however, the proportion of 
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children who both work and go to school is higher than that of those who are employed 
only.  In all three countries, rural children are more likely to go to school and work than 
are their urban counterparts.  With regard to gender, fewer girls than boys attend school 
full-time, and more girls than boys are employed full-time and combine employment with 
schooling. 
 
Table 4Childrens time allocation into employment, schooling, and/or both 
 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 All Rural Urban All Rural Urban All Rural Urban
 (percent) 
By residence           
  Schooling  52.4 46.6 75.8  64.6 42.4 78.7 87.0 85.9 90.9 
  Employment 26.8 30.8 10.6  5.6 10.1 2.8 8.3 10.0 2.8 
  Both  11.8 13.6 4.6  20.3 37.7 9.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 
  Neither 9.0 9.0 9.1  9.5 9.8 9.2 4.3 3.9 5.9 
    Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
 Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
 (percent) 
By sex        
  Schooling  59.5 44.9  67.2 62.0 89.8 84.2 
  Employment  21.2 32.6  4.7 6.6 6.1 10.6 
  Both 14.5 9.1  15.5 25.4 0.3 0.4 
  Neither 4.8 13.4  12.7 6.1 3.8 4.8 
    Total 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
The Role of Children in the Household 
The means of selected household and community characteristics variables are 
presented in Table 5.  At the household level, mens share of household income is highest 
in Nepal, followed by Zimbabwe and Peru.  In all countries, women and childrens share 
of household income grows, while the corresponding share for mens tends to shrink in 
urban areas.  Childrens share of household income is largest in Nepal, while there is a 
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Table 5Means of selected variables 
 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 All Urban Rural All Urban Rural All Urban Rural
            
Household size 5.59 5.28 5.67  5.38 5.31 5.50  5.03 4.32 5.43
Urban (yes) 0.19 -- --  0.61 -- --  0.25 -- -- 
Child Sex (female) 0.48 0.45 0.49  0.51 0.50 0.52  0.50 0.52 0.49
Child age  13.28 13.33 13.3  13.5 13.62 13.18  13.2 13.40 13.18
Mans share of total income 0.81 0.72 0.82  0.73 0.69 0.79  0.75 0.84 0.65
Womans share of total income 0.12 0.23 0.10  0.24 0.28 0.17  0.20 0.16 0.25
Childs share of total income 0.06 0.03 0.07  0.04 0.03 0.04  0.02 0.002 0.04
Ratio of childs to mans labor hours 0.27 0.13 0.31  0.12 0.08 0.19  0.06 0.02 0.08
Ratio of childs to womans labor 
hours 0.30 0.26 0.31 
 0.36 0.26 0.49  0.11 0.05 0.12
Child ever been to school (yes) 0.68 0.86 0.67  0.99 1.00 0.98  0.99 0.99 0.99
Child attending school (yes) 0.61 0.80 0.60  0.85 0.88 0.80  0.88 0.91 0.87
Child employed (yes) 0.40 0.13 0.42  0.26 0.12 0.48  0.08 0.03 0.10
            
Community-level characteristics            
  School expensesa 82.9 217.2 66.1  106.5 137.5 42.8  28.4 65.19 18.07
  Mans wage per hour 15.24 17.04 15.01  2.70 3.33 1.40  0.16 0.40 0.09
  Womans wage per hour 15.77 17.32 15.58  2.07 2.49 1.20  0.09 0.27 0.04
  Childs wage per hour 9.37 8.56 9.47  0.93 1.05 0.67  0.05 0.10 0.04
  Electricity (yes) 0.33 0.89 0.25  0.74 0.97 0.26  0.21 0.87 0.03
  Water storage (1=best, 5=worst) 3.50 2.98 3.57  2.22 1.49 3.71  3.52 1.49 4.09
a Monetary figures are nominal and presented at the year of survey and using respective currency of each country (i.e., 
rupees for Nepal, sols for Peru, and Z$ for Zimbabwe). 
 
 
negligible difference between Peru and Zimbabwe.  Rural children in Zimbabwe 
contribute more to household income than do their urban counterparts.  Similarly, in rural 
Nepal, children contribute a nontrivial 7 percent of household income, compared to only 
3 percent for their urban counterparts.  It should be noted that quantifying the share of 
child-generated welfare for a household would be difficult and may be easily 
underestimated, since children contribute in several ways that are not reflected in 
monetary terms.  In addition, the data may be deficient due to a high likelihood of 
underreporting of the incomes generated by even gainfully employed and remunerated 
children (Basu 1999). 
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Table 5 also presents the ratio of childrens labor hours to both mens and 
womens in the household.  Child labor participation in all countries is closely related to 
their relative contribution to household income.  Child labor participation is lowest in 
Zimbabwe, as is their share in overall household income.  Urban-rural disparities are 
interesting:  the ratio of child labor hours to both mens and womens is larger in rural 
areas in all countries, underscoring the abundance of child labor in rural household 
chores.  However, the urban child-labor environment is still alarming, with the ratio of 
child-labor hours to adult-labor hours in excess of 1 to 10 in both Peru and Nepal.  The 
descriptive statistics suggest that the rate of incidence of child labor varies from country 
to country and by urban and rural areas within countries, but all country evidence 
confirms that the number of children working is high enough to make the issue a matter 
of important concern.  
 
4. The Empirical Model 
A parents decision to send a child to school, work, or both is a time allocation 
decision.  Thus the decision whether a child works or goes to school is a joint one as both 
activities could be competing for childs time.  An econometric specification that 
explicitly takes this interdependency into account can be obtained from equation (10).  
Rewriting equation (10) using a random utility function for Vs(.) and Vu(.), and restating 
the decision in terms of probabilities enables us to characterize child schooling and work 
decisions jointly.  We use a bivariate probit model to test the likelihood of children 
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working and going to school conditional on varying individual, household, and 
community characteristics.  A bivariate probit model allows for the existence of possible 
correlated disturbance between two probit equations.  It also allows us to test whether the 
joint estimation has significantly more explanatory power compared to using univariate 
probit estimation for each decision. 
Let y1* be the latent variable representing the decision to work and y2* represent 
the decision of schooling.  Then, using the notations in equations (8)-(10), the bivariate 
probit specification will take the following general structure11: 
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where ηs and ηu are error terms with normal distributions, and ρ is the coefficient of 
correlation between the two equations; E, V, C, and BVN stand for expectation, variance, 
covariance, and bivariate normal distribution functions, respectively. 
 
Explanatory Variables, Endogeneity Issues, and Empirical Strategy 
In line with the objectives of the paper and the conceptual model presented in 
Section 2, an extensive list of explanatory variables was used to examine the relative role 
                                                 
11 See Greene (1997) for a good description of bivariate probit model and Canagarajah and Coulombe 
(1998) for an application to child labor and schooling decisions. 
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of several individual, household, and community variables on both child schooling and 
work decisions.  The explanatory variables include measures of labor market conditions, 
poverty, credit access, school availability and cost, and variables accounting for 
household domestic responsibilities.  These variables are considered as main 
determinants of child labor in the literature, but there is no consensus as to which is most 
important.  We anticipate that the role of these variables varies significantly between 
rural and urban areas.  The following briefly discusses the rationale for the selection of 
the main explanatory variables and the steps taken to address potential endogeneity 
problems. 
Child- and adult-labor market conditions are measured by average wage paid per 
hour at the community level, not wage rates derived at individual levels.  Community-
level average wages provide a better description of prevailing labor market conditions 
than individual-level wages, and they are based on wages reported by individuals who 
actually work.  Furthermore, being community-level averages, they are less prone to 
endogeneity problems.  Since incomplete pooling of resources among household 
members appears to be the norm (Strauss and Thomas 1995), adult female and male wage 
variables are included separately to capture the differential impact of both women and 
mens incomes on work and schooling decisions for their children.  Explicit inclusion of 
separate wage educational-level variables for men and women thus relaxes the unitary 
modeling assumption and reflects differences in preference and bargaining power 
between mother and father. 
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Credit access is found to be very difficult to measure from Living Standard 
Measurement Surveys, which usually ask if a given household had a loan and bank 
accounts.  Having a loan alone is not a good measure of access to credit since households 
who did not report receiving a loan might have access to credit but no need to borrow.  
Note also that credit constraints are more likely to bind for the poor since their incomes 
are low and more risky, thus making credit access potentially endogenous to schooling 
and work decisions.  As a result, only access to a commercial branch bank at the 
community level is used as a proxy measure of access to the formal credit market.  Since 
this still is not a significant measure of access to credit, the results should be interpreted 
with caution. 
Other common determinants that figure predominantly in child labor empirical 
work, such as parents educational level, head age, and sex, are among the explanatory 
variables.  Also included is a measure of domestic responsibilities in terms of the 
number of very young children in the household.  This may adversely affect child 
schooling decisions and may be even more detrimental of schooling of girls.  It is widely 
accepted that girls are more likely than boys to help their mothers with housework and 
childcare.  Gender disparities in education could also arise due to differences in expected 
earnings or remittance propensities among boys and girls.  The inclusion of a child 
gender dummy will address these and other possibilities that lead to differential 
employment and enrollments rates among boys and girls.  Another variable of interest is 
whether the mother works outside the home, which may be correlated with child working 
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decisions; a dummy variable that indicates if a mother works outside the home is used to 
capture this effect. 
Some school-related variables at community levelthe number of schools 
available and the cost of schooling per pupilare included among explanatory 
variables.12  School accessibility can affect schooling decisions to the extent that child-
time spent going to and from school entails a significant opportunity cost to the parent.  
Educational expenses per pupil could be a good measure of educational resources 
available to students as well as their teachers in terms of facilities, tuition, books, and 
other school related expenses.  Thus the cost of schooling is included because it could be 
an important determinant of the likelihood of child work.  All right-hand side variables 
are carefully selected in such a way that consistent reduced-form estimation is achieved 
by excluding potential endogenous variables.  The inclusion of regional dummies and 
community-level characteristics variables helps capture variation in productivity, labor 
demand, and differences in other aspects, such as culture and attitude. 
Finally, in accordance with the theoretical model, the household-level poverty 
measure is based on nonwage income from various sources, such as profits from self-
employment in farming and nonfarming activities, interest from household assets, and 
other nonlabor income sources.  This measure takes into account the intertemporal nature 
of child schooling and work decisions as shown in equation (6).  However, nonwage 
                                                 
12 Specific household- or school-level variables are likely to suffer from endogeneity.  For instance, 
household expenses on education are incurred only for children for whom the decision was made to enroll 
in school.  Such variables are endogenous to child labor decisions.  This problem is circumvented by 
averaging household-level, school-related variables over relevant geographic units in the survey, or by 
using community-level variables whenever possible. 
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income may be endogenous to child labor and schooling decisions, primarily due to the 
fact that children may contribute to nonwage income through involvement in family 
farming and nonfarming activities that do not pay wages.13  But this measure is an 
improvement over most previous studies on child labor and schooling decisions that use 
total household income as an explanatory variable.  It is anticipated that nonwage income 
suffers less from endogeneity problems compared to total household income, which 
includes both wage income and nonwage incomes. 
The empirical strategy used to address the potential endogeneity of nonwage 
income is through an instrumental variable approach.  Two regimes are estimated, using 
nonwage income as a measure of poverty, and an instrumental variable estimation in 
which household asset ownership are used as instruments for nonwage income.  There is 
also testing for endogeneity using Smith and Blundells (1986) exogeneity test.  In this 
case, the test involves specifying that the exogeneity of nonwage income is under 
suspicion.  Under the null hypothesis, the models are appropriately specified with all 
explanatory variables exogenous.  Under the alternative hypothesis, the suspected 
endogenous variable, nonwage income, is expressed as linear projection of a set of 
instruments, and the residuals from those first-stage regressions are added to the model.  
Under the null hypothesis, these residuals should have no explanatory power.  Once the 
standard order condition for identification of the model is met, the significance of the 
coefficient on the residual term is used to establish endogeneity of nonwage income. 
                                                 
13 One might also argue that nonwage income represents the accumulation of assets related to labor income 
over the life cycle.  However, this presents less of a problem when dealing with child labor income. 
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5. Empirical Results 
The joint schooling and employment results are estimated with and without 
instrumenting for nonwage income, which is used as a measure of poverty.  Instruments 
for nonwage income were the value of household asset holdings for Nepal and Peru, and 
a vector of asset holding indicator dummies for Zimbabwe.14  Both results are reported.  
Appendix Tables 6 and 7 present bivariate probit model estimates of child labor and 
schooling decisions for rural areas, while Appendix Tables 8 and 9 do so for urban areas.  
In general, the coefficients on nonwage income appreciably reduces in its absolute 
magnitude after instrumenting, thus indicating an upward bias in the non-instrumented 
coefficient of household income.15 
The joint estimation of schooling and work is appropriate as the likelihood ratio 
tests of the hypothesis that the correlation between the error terms (ρ) is zero are soundly 
rejected for all cases except for Peru.16  A significantly negative ρ implies that some 
unobserved factors that increase the probability of attending school decrease the 
likelihood of working.  Schooling and child labor are thus competing activities.  On the 
                                                 
14 Asset values were not given for the Zimbabwe data.  A set of dummy variables that indicate ownership 
of different asset types was used as instruments for Zimbabwe. 
15 See Psacharopoulos (1997), Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997), Grootaert (1998), Grootaert and 
Patrinos (1998), Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998), and others for discussion on endogeneity of household 
income and potential upward bias in its coefficient.  The upward bias may be due to the entanglement of 
substitution effects with income effects when some productive assets are used to proxy income (Bhalotra 
2000b). 
16 There is no definitive positive or negative correlation between child schooling and employment decisions 
in rural Peru.  Compared to Nepal and Zimbabwe results, much less significant negative correlation exists 
between schooling and employment decisions on urban Peru as well. 
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other hand, schooling and working decisions appear rather noncompetitive in Peru, but 
there is insufficient evidence to claim these decisions are complementary. 
The lack of significantly negative association between child schooling and work 
decisions in Peru is contrary to the common perception that child schooling is an inverse 
of child labor decisions.  While the argument that anything that promotes school 
attendance is likely to dent child labor is quite sensible, the Peruvian case provides 
counterevidence that the two activities are not necessarily competitive.  The descriptive 
statistics showed that the proportion of those children who work and go to school at the 
same time is highest in Peru. 
The intensity of work also merits attention since the hours of work could exhibit 
substantial variability among the children who are reported to be in the labor force.  The 
intensity of workhours of work per weekis estimated as a function of the same set of 
variables employed in the joint modeling of schooling and work decisions using a Tobit 
and instrumental variables Tobit (IV Tobit17) estimators.  The estimates of child labor 
supply are presented on Appendix Tables 10 and 11 for rural and urban areas, 
respectively.  Factors that significantly affect child employment decisions continue to 
affect the number of hours children actually work in the same direction.  As such, 
intensity of work results is discussed concurrently with the joint schooling and work 
estimation, and labor supply estimates only referred to when there are additional insights 
to be gained.  In the next sections child labor and schooling estimates are discussed, 
                                                 
17 See Smith and Blundell (1986) for a description of IV Tobit. 
27 
focusing on the similarities and differences between cross-country results, and separately 
for rural and urban areas. 
 
Rural Child Labor and Schooling Decisions 
Appendix Tables 6 and 7 present a bivariate probit and instrumental variables 
estimates for rural areas.  The Smith and Blundell exogeneity test indicates that nonwage 
income is endogenous in the child labor and schooling decisions.  Significance of 
instruments test shows strong support that household asset holdings are a relevant 
instrument for nonwage income (with p-value < 0.0001).18 
All country results indicate that child schooling is negatively associated with age 
and female gender, as girls and older childrens school attendance rates are significantly 
lower than those for boys and younger children.  Correspondingly, the probability of 
being employed rises significantly with age in all three countries.  The likelihood of 
employment also increases with girls in Nepal and Zimbabwe, but in rural Peru, boys 
tend to have higher propensities for employment. 
The impact of rural child labor market conditions on schooling and work, as 
measured by child labor wages at the community level, is effectively zero for all 
countries except the non-instrumented estimates for rural Nepal, casting doubt on the 
hypothesis that improved labor market conditions drive child labor, at least in rural areas.  
In rural Nepal, the non-instrumental estimates indicate that higher wages for child labor 
                                                 
18 Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) suggest that the F statistic of the identifying instruments in the first-
stage is a useful indicator of the quality of the IV estimates. 
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lead to higher enrollment rates, lower probability of employment, and significantly fewer 
hours of work per week for those children who work.  This outcome, although it appears 
counterintuitive from the viewpoint that higher wages should lead agents to work more 
hours, is quite plausible if subsistence constraints are binding.  In other words, if 
households are very poor and they risk falling below subsistence requirements in the 
absence of child earnings, a decrease in child wages must be compensated for by an 
increase in child work hours or by bringing more children to the work force in order to 
meet the subsistence target.19  On the other hand, evidence exists that improved labor 
market conditions for other adult household members lead to higher enrollment rates and 
less employment for Nepalese children, and lower employment rates for Peruvian 
children.  Also, higher wages for adult women in rural Zimbabwe are associated with a 
low prevalence of child labor. 
In rural Nepal and Zimbabwe, there is supportive evidence, from both 
instrumental and non-instrumental estimates, for Basu and Vans (1998) luxury axiom 
that statesA family will send the children to the labor market only if the familys 
income from nonchild-labor sources drops very low.  While poverty reduces the 
probability of child schooling, it increases the probability of child employment and 
intensity of work significantly.  The labor supply estimates in Appendix Table 10 show 
that if a Nepalese household had its nonlabor assets increased by 100 rupees, it would 
                                                 
19 This result is similar to Bhalotras (2000a), who finds significantly negative wage elasticity for boys in 
rural Pakistan.  She finds that if the wage rate drops, boys work more hours to make up for the loss in 
earnings.  On the other hand, a higher wage rate is associated with less work.  Indeed, her poverty 
hypothesis is based on the outcome that the wage elasticity is negative. 
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decrease child labor hours by about 5.76 hours per week.  Zimbabwean households 
would decrease child work hours by about 4.90 hours per week if there were a temporary 
positive shock (an increase of 100 Zimbabwe dollars) that would make liquidity 
constraints less binding.  In annual terms, these are significant reductions in child labor 
hours, as would be predicted by Basu and Vans (1998) model.  If the households 
decision to send children to work stems from survival concerns, as the evidence from 
rural Nepal and Zimbabwe indicates, the adult labor market results make it reasonable to 
expect that parents would not send their children to work if their own wages were higher 
or employment opportunities wide enough to enable them to pass beyond the subsistence 
threshold.  In rural Peru, nonwage wealth appears to have no impact on child labor and 
schooling decisions, thus providing neither support for nor evidence against the notion 
that poverty drives child labor. 
Other household-level variables, such as the educational levels of both the highest 
educated man and woman in the family, significantly improve child education and 
decrease the likelihood of employment and intensity of work in all three countries.  This 
finding reinforces the universally accepted notion that parental education is the most 
consistent determinant of child education and employment decisions.  Higher domestic 
responsibilities in terms of the number of young children under age 5 do not lead to an 
increase in the likelihood that their older siblings work in rural areas.  However, mothers 
working outside the home means a higher probability of children working in Nepal and 
Peru, although it also appears to improve child schooling in rural Nepal.  The positive 
effect on child schooling of the mother working outside the home in rural Nepal may be 
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explained by a higher income effect, which makes it possible to pay for daycare and 
domestic help, so children are not necessarily taken out of school when their mothers 
work.  But for lower income families, it is likely the case that a mother working outside 
the home means less schooling and more work for children. 
Rural infrastructure and school-related community-level variables significantly 
affect schooling and work decisions in all countries.  Higher average educational 
expenses at the community level appear to improve school enrollment rates and 
correspondingly decrease child employment and intensity of work in rural Nepal and 
Zimbabwe.  Similarly a higher number of schools in a given community leads to higher 
enrollment and lower employment rates and work hours per week in Nepal.  Thus, to the 
extent that the number of schools and school-related expenditures in terms of tuition, 
books, teacher salaries, fewer students per teacher, etc., are indicators of school 
accessibility and quality, improving the availability of good schools could lead to less 
child labor and more child schooling. 
In rural Nepal and Zimbabwe, access to a commercial bank has a positive effect 
on schooling and a negative impact on employment.  Credit access appears to have higher 
negative effect on employment than its corresponding positive effect on schooling.  This 
may imply that credits are sought more to smooth consumption risks and other household 
needs than for child schooling purposes.  Rural credit needs are driven by incidental risks 
and for temporary shocks, more so than a long-term goal of child schooling.  This may 
imply that in the absence of such credit schemes, child labor may become part of a 
strategy to minimize the risk of interruption of income stream, for example, a risk of 
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failed harvest, etc.  This finding is in concurrence with Jacoby and Skoufiass (1997) and 
Sawadas (1999) empirical evidence that children are taken out of school in response to 
household income shocks in rural India and Pakistan, respectively.  In both rural Nepal 
and Zimbabwe, there is evidence that credit access reduces child labor and improves 
child school enrollment, thus supporting Ranjans (1999) and Lahiri and Jaffrey (1999) 
argument that an incomplete credit market could be driving child labor.  In rural Peru, on 
the other hand, access to loan and banking services appears to increase employment and 
decrease schooling. 
 
Urban Child Labor and Schooling Decisions 
Appendix Tables 8 and 9 present the results for urban areas.  Although the Smith 
and Blundell test rejects the exogeneity of nonwage, the evidence is weaker for urban 
areas.  As discussed below, the reason for this weak evidence might be due to the fact 
that, unlike in rural areas, poverty is not a good determinant of schooling and work 
decisions in urban areas.  Significance of instruments test supports that household asset 
holdings are a relevant instrument for nonwage income (with p-value < 0.0001). 
Similar to rural cases, it is clear that in urban areas, older children are less likely 
to go to school and girls are less likely to stay in school than boys in all three countries 
(see Appendix Tables 8 and 9).  One can argue that as children grow older and acquire 
skills, the opportunity cost of schooling rises.  Child age continues to be positively 
correlated with the likelihood of employment and number of hours worked.  However, 
the impact of gender on employment is mixed in urban areas:  boys (girls) are more likely 
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to be employed in Peru (Zimbabwe) and gender is insignificant in urban Nepal.  
Improved child labor markets provide strong incentives for child employment in urban 
Peru.  The Peruvian result is comparable with findings in other Latin American countries 
that suggest improved market conditions drive child labor (see, for instance, Levison, 
Moe, and Knaul 1999 and Binder 1999).  Peru, among all three countries examined in 
this paper, has the largest proportion of children who are both working and going to 
school at the same time (see Table 4).  The fact that child wage is positively associated 
with the employment decision may imply that some children work for the purpose of 
earning educational expenses.  The number of hours children work also increases 
significantly with child labor wages in urban areas of Peru and Zimbabwe. 
Sufficient evidence from urban areas of all three countries for Basu and Vans 
(1998) luxury axiom that poverty drives child labor is not found.  Similar analysis done 
separately for boys and girls by Ray (2000a) also shows no evidence for the luxury axiom 
in Peru.  Although the theoretical literature on child labor such as the seminal paper by 
Basu and Van (1998) tends to lead many to believe that poverty is the primary cause of 
child employment, this result shows that poverty does not appear to be the main culprit in 
determining child labor in urban areas.  While studies that lump together urban and rural 
areas obscure these differences and their results become hard to interpret, examining 
urban and rural child labor responses separately thus enabled a scrutinizing of the validity 
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and applicability of the luxury axiom.  More evidence for it exists in rural areas and less 
or no evidence for it in urban areas.20 
Household educational level variables, especially womans education, continues 
to significantly reduce the probability of child labor and improve the likelihood of 
children being in school in all cases.  Parental educational level has been critical in 
improving household livelihood and food and nutritional status of children (Ruel et al. 
1999; Strauss and Thomas 1995).  The urban result is similar to the rural and the results 
from other studies that underline the importance that parental, especially mothers, 
education on childrens human capital development. 
A measure of domestic responsibilities, number of young children under age 5, 
plays a critical role by keeping children away from school and forcing them into work.  
This result is contrary to the rural result that showed insignificant impact for the number 
of young children in the household.  The urban result is consistent with the findings of 
Cochrane, Kozel, and Alderman (1990), who report the presence of children under five in 
the household significantly reduces the educational participation of girls.  Similarly a 
positive likelihood that a mother works outside the home drives child employment 
decisions in all countries.  This urban-rural differential in the impact of domestic 
responsibilities and mother working decision may be due to the availability of extended 
family and kin members to help in childcaring activities in rural areas more so than in 
urban areas.  Rural mothers may also have greater control over their time allocation for 
                                                 
20 Empirical work by others, such as Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) for Ghana, also finds that poverty 
is not a major determinant of child schooling and work decisions. 
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childcare and work due to the nature of their job, such as working on own agricultural 
fields, while the urban workingwomen could be working in factories and under 
supervision of employers.  Moreover, it may be easier to combine childcare with work in 
rural than urban areas.  The availability of alternative childcare options such as providing 
working mothers with firm-level childcare for working mothers will likely have more 
impact in urban areas in terms of lessening the responsibility born by school-age children 
in taking care of their younger siblings while mothers are away for work.  It would also 
significantly free them up to go to school, as the evidence from these countries suggests.  
It has been observed that the presence of a daycare center decreases the likelihood that 
children engage in work at home (DeGraff, Bilsborrow, and Herrin 1993; Goonesekere 
1993).  Also note that having a working mother does lead to significantly more hours of 
work in urban areas of all countries (see Table 1). 
Urban infrastructure and school-related community-level variables do not factor 
in schooling and work decisions in urban Nepal and Zimbabwe, unlike in the rural areas.  
However, in urban Peru, educational expenses at the community level appear to improve 
child school enrollment rates.  Similar observations were made for another Latin 
American country by Brown (2001), who states that an increased cost of schooling is 
associated with a lower probability of work by Colombian children. Brown also 
suggests that, at least in the Colombian case, the cost of schooling is a proxy for school 
quality.  The deficiencies in facilities, teacher salaries, and other educational supplies are 
reported to be pervasive in both rural and urban Peru (Brown 2001).  For instance, citing 
the Ministry of Education of Peru, Brown points out that even in metropolitan Lima, only 
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60 percent of schools have electricity.  If school-related expenditures in terms of tuition, 
books, teacher salaries, etc., are plausible indicators of school quality in Peru, our 
empirical results suggest that improving school quality would likely keep more children 
in school. 
 
6.  Summary and Policy Implications 
The literature in child labor and schooling is voluminous and continually growing.  
However, studies are scant that simultaneously examine the various factors impacting 
child labor and schooling, such as poverty, credit access, labor market conditions, 
household domestic responsibilities, school expenditures, and parental educational levels, 
along with community characteristics important in such decisions.  One of the main aims 
of this paper is to examine the impact of one factor while controlling for others at the 
same time.  It is hoped that such an approach will help shed light on the debate over the 
correlates of child labor. 
This paper also examines urban and rural decisions separately, with the 
anticipation that urban-rural differentials in livelihood strategies and opportunities could 
be reflected in child employment and schooling decisions.  Aggregating urban and rural 
child labor, as is commonly done in some empirical studies, could obscure the differential 
impact of some factors on urban and rural child schooling and work decisions.  The 
simultaneous examination of a list of determinants of child schooling and employment 
decisions will enable us to identify the factors that are more important than others while 
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investigating their pertinence across countries and urban and rural areas within a given 
country. 
In all three countries and urban and rural areas alike, adult educational levels are 
essential factors in child employment and education, with a significant contribution to 
reduction of child labor and improvement in the likelihood that children stay in school.  
In concurrence with empirical evidence from other Latin American countries, improved 
child labor market conditions in terms of higher wages per hour increases both the 
probability and intensity of work in urban Peru and Zimbabwe, with no appreciable effect 
in rural areas.  Improvement in labor market conditions for adult labor leads to a lower 
probability of child labor and a higher probability of schooling.  Bolstering adult wages 
may thus help curb child labor participation and increase the probability that children stay 
in school. 
While poverty drives child work and schooling decisions in rural areas, it does not 
appear to significantly influence schooling and work participation rates in urban areas.  In 
rural areas, policies such as trade sanctions or a ban on child labor thus could have an 
adverse effect on both the household and the children because child labor decisions are 
more likely in response to poverty and subsistence requirements.  The rural evidence thus 
is in line with the seminal paper on the economics of child labor by Basu and Van (1998). 
Credit access, albeit measured imprecisely by access to a commercial bank, is 
likely to improve enrollment rates and decrease employment rates in rural areas of Nepal 
and Zimbabwe, in convergence with the theoretical results forwarded, for instance, by 
Ranjan (1999) and Lahiri and Jaffrey (1999).  Credit constraints are more likely to be 
37 
bound for the rural poor since their incomes are lower and more risky.  Thus with credit 
access, the rural poor in Nepal and Zimbabwe may find it a viable option to use credit to 
send their children to school and thus help cut the transmission of poverty across 
generations.  However, credit access does not play a similar role in urban areas of these 
two countries.  Access to credit may have actually enabled rural Peruvian parents to 
overcome entry barriers and venture into their own entrepreneurial activities in which 
child labor may be utilized when there are incomplete labor markets. 
Household domestic responsibilities in terms of the number of young children 
under 5 and the likelihood that mother works away from the home have more significant 
impact on urban child labor and schooling decisions than on those of rural areas.  This 
implies that the availability of alternative childcare options would be more critical for 
working urban mothers compared to their rural counterparts. 
Summing up, the evidence from Nepal, Peru, and Zimbabwe indicates that the 
impact of poverty on children depends on location.  While there is strong evidence that 
poverty drives child labor in rural areas, there is a general lack of support for a poverty 
hypothesis in urban areas.  Similarly improving credit access has greater potential for 
alleviating child labor and enhancing school enrollment in rural than urban areas, 
particularly in Nepal and Zimbabwe.  Finally, the evidence from all three countries and 
both urban and rural areas indicates that the availability of good schools, and efforts to 
bolster adult educational levels and wages, will help curb the prevalence and intensity of 
child labor and improve the likelihood that children stay in school. 
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Table 6Joint child and schooling decisions in rural areas 
 Nepal Peru  Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Schooling 
(2) 
Employment
(3) 
Schooling 
(4) 
Employment 
 (5) 
Schooling 
(6) 
Employment
        
Sex (female) -0.679 0.172 -0.273 -0.624  -0.326 0.329 
 (12.87)*** (3.44)*** (3.14)*** (8.63)***  (9.94)*** (9.50)*** 
Age -0.153 0.200 -0.244 0.088  -0.262 0.244 
 (12.69)*** (17.07)*** (12.09)*** (5.43)***  (32.97)*** (29.45)*** 
Child wage 0.037 -0.036 0.071 0.195  -0.165 -0.027 
 (2.20)*** (2.40)*** (0.33) (1.13)  (0.39) (0.06) 
Mans wage 0.009 -0.006 0.467 -0.680  -0.090 0.475 
 (3.36)*** (2.40)*** (1.30) (2.93)***  (0.25) (1.24) 
Womans wage -0.005 0.005 0.054 -0.253  0.460 -0.933 
 (1.56) (1.81) (0.31) (1.73)  (0.97) (1.81)* 
Nonwage income .711 -0.306 0.507 -0.297  1.386 -1.624 
 (10.67)*** (4.97)*** (0.73) (0.49)  (4.05)*** (4.48)*** 
# Young children  -0.023 0.046 -0.043 -0.063  -0.036 0.049 
 (1.13) (2.35)* (1.07) (1.80)*  (2.55)** (3.33)*** 
Head sex (female) -0.155 -0.174 0.237 0.280  0.129 -0.115 
 (1.79)* (2.03)* (1.58) (2.11)**  (3.30)*** (2.80)*** 
Head age 0.041 -0.021 -0.050 0.020  -0.025 0.021 
 (1.84)* (0.98) (1.25) (0.58)  (1.95)* (1.57) 
Mans education 0.063 -0.034 0.166 -0.143  0.065 -0.069 
 (8.89)*** (5.22)*** (2.49)* (2.64)***  (6.52)*** (6.56)*** 
Womans education 0.063 -0.048 0.154 -0.116  0.144 -0.111 
 (5.28)*** (4.53)*** (2.36)** (2.19)**  (12.82)*** (9.45)*** 
Mother works outside home 0.294 0.166 0.261 0.659  -0.340 0.403 
 (3.43)*** (1.99)** (2.22)** (6.01)***  (3.72)*** (3.89)*** 
Community-level variables        
  Educational expenses 0.011 -0.016 1.550 0.375  1.257 -2.029 
 (1.96)* (2.92)*** (1.31) (0.40)  (4.05)*** (6.20)*** 
  Access to a bank (1=yes, 0=no) 0.081 -0.270 -1.959 2.870  0.289 -0.382 
 (1.03) (3.61)*** (1.30) (2.57)*  (2.97)*** (3.71)*** 
  Number of schools 0.052 -0.024      
 (5.80)*** (2.84)***      
  Water storage (1=best, 5=worst) -0.151 0.137 0.258 -0.132  0.238 -0.071 
 (3.83)*** (3.72)*** (1.26) (0.82)  (5.82)*** (1.58) 
  Electricity 0.096 -0.097 0.878 -0.846    
 (1.34) (1.43) (1.28) (1.78)*    
  Sewage disposal (1=best, 5=worst)   0.182 0.026    
   (0.87) (0.16)    
Regional dummies        
  Rural West-Hill 0.188 0.049      
 (2.40)* (0.65)      
  Rural East-Hill 0.241 0.174      
 (2.87)*** (2.18)*      
  Rural-West Tera 0.145 0.148      
 (1.58) (1.68)*      
  Siera North   -0.288 -0.251    
   (2.07)** (2.11)**    
  Siera Central    0.329 0.265    
   (2.10)** (2.36)**    
  Selva Alta North   -0.697 -0.205    
   (3.84)*** (1.23)    
  Selva Alta South   0.289 -0.406    
   (0.89) (1.54)    
  Selva Baja   -0.675 0.331    
   (4.76)*** (2.75)***    
  Coastal North    -0.156 -0.377    
   (0.86) (2.44)**    
  Coastal South   -0.458 -0.685    
   (1.22) (1.66)*    
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 Nepal Peru  Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Schooling 
(2) 
Employment
(3) 
Schooling 
(4) 
Employment 
 (5) 
Schooling 
(6) 
Employment
        
  Mashonaland N      -0.135 0.146 
      (2.08)** (2.14)** 
  Mashonaland E      0.028 0.016 
      (0.36) (0.19) 
  Mashonaland W      0.141 -0.304 
      (1.98)** (3.94)*** 
  Matabeleland N      -0.179 0.165 
      (2.16)** (1.92) 
  Matabeleland S      -0.247 0.311 
      (3.30)*** (3.98)*** 
  Midlands      0.175 -0.134 
      (2.73)*** (2.01)** 
  Masvingo      -0.136 0.104 
      (2.14)* (1.56) 
Constant 1.325 -2.400 1.542 -0.321  3.625 -4.217 
 (4.27)*** (8.18)*** (1.07) (0.31)  (15.52)*** (16.55)*** 
ρ -0.760 0.025  -0.980 
Wald test Χ2(40) = 907.0*** Χ2(48) = 457.5***  Χ2(44) = 1,548.6*** 
Likelihood ratio test: ρ = 0 Χ2(1) = 661.9*** Χ2(1) = 0.1804  Χ2(1) = 4,013.8*** 
Observations 2,879 2,879 1,395 1,395  11,523 11,523 
Notes:  Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses.  * is significant at 10 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; 
*** is significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 7Joint child and schooling decisions in rural areas, IV estimates 
 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Schooling 
(2) 
Employment
(3) 
Schooling 
(4) 
Employment 
(5) 
Schooling 
(6) 
Employment
       
Sex (female) -0.644 0.134 -0.257 -0.660 -0.328 0.356 
 (12.17)*** (2.68)*** (2.61)*** (7.92)*** (8.18)*** (8.42)*** 
Age -0.167 0.203 -0.234 0.072 -0.277 0.257 
 (13.20)*** (16.72)*** (8.57)*** (3.14)*** (27.81)*** (24.87)*** 
Child wage 0.005 -0.008 -0.030 0.342 0.557 -0.073 
 (0.27) (0.48) (0.11) (1.55) (0.99) (0.12) 
Mans wage 0.010 -0.005 0.527 -0.751 -0.328 0.662 
 (3.52)*** (2.00)** (1.42) (3.12)*** (0.71) (1.38) 
Womans wage -0.003 0.004 0.022 -0.154 1.444 -1.840 
 (1.07) (1.47) (0.12) (0.98) (2.39)** (2.82)*** 
Nonwage income (predicted) 0.747 -0.184 -0.143 0.196 0.746 -0.602 
 (5.16)*** (1.72)* (0.54) (0.85) (7.51)*** (5.78)*** 
Residuals from first-stage 
regression 
0.102 -0.042 0.156 -0.027 0.015 -0.023 
 (3.20)*** (1.76) (1.14) (0.23) (1.07) (1.62) 
# Young children  0.009 0.026 -0.102 0.019 -0.088 0.044 
 (0.41) (1.25) (0.87) (0.19) (3.67)*** (1.78) 
Head sex (female) -0.157 -0.079 0.031 0.515 0.012 -0.016 
 (1.84)* (0.92) (0.08) (1.63) (0.23) (0.30) 
Head age 0.085 -0.034 -0.035 -0.010 -0.012 0.021 
 (3.88)*** (1.63) (0.58) (0.19) (0.80) (1.31) 
Mans education 0.045 -0.030 0.198 -0.177 0.080 -0.084 
 (5.15)*** (3.82)*** (2.09)** (2.27)** (6.57)*** (6.58)*** 
Womans education 0.065 -0.051 0.217 -0.207 0.118 -0.079 
 (5.57)*** (4.89)*** (1.72)* (1.92)* (8.56)*** (5.52)*** 
Mother works outside home 0.209 0.326 0.161 0.812 -0.089 0.157 
 (2.45)** (3.84)*** (0.81) (4.54)*** (0.80) (1.25) 
Community-level variables       
  Educational expenses 0.038 -0.026 1.462 0.500 -0.654 -0.511 
 (6.49)*** (4.72)*** (1.20) (0.53) (1.47) (1.09) 
  Access to a bank (yes) 0.088 -0.283 -2.455 3.327 0.243 -0.404 
 (1.12) (3.76)*** (1.48) (2.61)*** (2.03)** (3.18)*** 
  Number of schools 0.075 -0.039     
 (8.23)*** (4.66)***     
  Water storage (1=best, 5=worst) -0.160 0.133 0.280 -0.177 0.334 -0.146 
 (4.01)*** (3.62)*** (1.36) (1.10) (6.04)*** (2.43)** 
  Electricity -0.002 -0.090 1.064 -0.867   
 (0.03) (1.29) (1.48) (1.73)*   
  Sewage disposal (1=best, 5=worst)   0.184 0.075   
   (0.86) (0.45)   
Regional dummies       
  Rural West-Hill 0.327 0.084     
 (3.94)*** (1.09)     
  Rural East-Hill 0.433 0.095     
 (5.13)*** (1.18)     
  Rural-West Tera 0.062 0.213     
 (0.67) (2.39)**     
  Siera North   -0.329 -0.185   
   (2.25)** (1.48)   
  Siera Central    0.436 0.166   
   (2.09)** (1.02)   
  Selva Alta North   -0.630 -0.273   
   (2.99)*** (1.45)   
  Selva Alta South   0.382 -0.542   
   (0.99) (1.68)*   
  Selva Baja   -0.392 -0.021   
   (0.74) (0.05)   
  Coastal North   -0.201 -0.296   
   (1.07) (1.83)*   
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 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Schooling 
(2) 
Employment
(3) 
Schooling 
(4) 
Employment 
(5) 
Schooling 
(6) 
Employment
       
  Coastal South   -0.062 -1.166   
   (0.08) (1.67)*   
  Mashonaland N     -0.194 0.242 
     (2.44)** (2.93)*** 
  Mashonaland E     -0.297 0.246 
     (2.81)*** (2.20)** 
  Mashonaland W     -0.118 -0.087 
     (1.25) (0.86) 
  Matabeleland N     -0.296 0.269 
     (2.85)*** (2.51)** 
  Matabeleland S     -0.333 0.431 
     (3.64)*** (4.54)*** 
  Midlands     -0.096 0.086 
     (1.12) (0.97) 
  Masvingo     -0.427 0.360 
     (4.76)*** (3.85)*** 
Constant 1.265 -2.703 1.932 -1.063 3.298 -4.043 
 (4.00)*** (8.75)*** (1.14) (0.84) (10.43)*** (11.77)*** 
ρ -0.769 0.031 -0.987 
Wald test Χ2(42) = 871.7*** Χ2(50) = 458.0*** Χ2(46) = 1,119.2*** 
Likelihood ratio test: ρ = 0 Χ2(1) = 688.2*** Χ2(1) = 0.275 Χ2(1) = 2,835.0*** 
Test for relevance of instrument(s) t-statistic = 13.99 
P-value < 0.00001 
t-statistic = 1.79 
P-value < 0.074 
F-statistic = 22.17 
P-value < 0.00001 
Observations 2,884 2,884 1,387 1,387 8,654 8,654 
Notes:  Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses.  * is significant at 10 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; 
*** is significant at 1 percent. 
 
43 
Table 8Joint child and schooling decisions in urban areas 
 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Schooling 
(2) 
Employment
(3) 
Schooling 
(4) 
Employment 
(5) 
Schooling 
(6) 
Employment
       
Sex (female) -0.312 -0.179 -0.176 -0.367 -0.315 0.536 
 (2.42)** (1.30) (1.97)** (4.72)*** (4.39)*** (5.05)*** 
Age -0.160 0.215 -0.262 0.144 -0.321 0.220 
 (4.95)*** (6.14)*** (11.84)*** (8.04)*** (16.62)*** (9.26)*** 
Child wage 0.097 0.052 -0.063 0.157 -0.155 0.670 
 (1.45) (0.85) (0.99) (2.59)*** (0.54) (1.92)* 
Mans wage 0.040 -0.003 -0.084 -0.096 0.745 -1.821 
 (2.91)*** (0.23) (1.59) (1.73)* (1.11) (1.82)* 
Womans wage 0.013 -0.013 -0.158 0.088 0.048 -3.259 
 (2.24) (1.75) (1.68)* (1.02) (0.04) (2.19)** 
Nonwage income 0.015 0.020 -0.731 -0.213 -0.025 -0.087 
 (0.33) (0.39) (2.15)** (1.40) (0.12) (0.33) 
# Young children  -0.158 0.136 -0.040 0.021 -0.089 0.116 
 (2.32)** (1.74) (0.76) (0.49) (2.31)** (2.20)** 
Head sex (female) -0.194 0.123 0.080 -0.033 -0.337 -0.114 
 (0.94) (0.56) (0.65) (0.31) (3.28)*** (0.73) 
Head age -0.164 -0.001 -0.099 -0.068 0.081 -0.130 
 (2.95)*** (0.01) (2.34)** (1.78) (2.40)** (2.90)*** 
Mans education 0.051 -0.045 -0.034 -0.002 0.023 -0.052 
 (3.29)*** (2.61)*** (0.61) (0.04) (1.05) (1.72)* 
Womans education 0.053 -0.053 -0.083 -0.250 0.092 -0.128 
 (3.26)*** (2.92)*** (1.48) (5.14)*** (4.02)*** (4.13)*** 
Mother works outside home -0.024 0.372 0.049 0.598 -0.597 1.150 
 (0.17) (2.32)** (0.47) (5.82)*** (4.87)*** (4.40)*** 
Community-level variables       
  Educational expenses 0.005 -0.007 0.014 -0.001 0.241 -0.155 
 (0.79) (0.97) (14.36)*** (2.56)** (1.45) (0.78) 
  Access to a bank (1=yes, 0=no) -0.364 -0.151 0.026 -1.915 -0.119 1.080 
 (1.53) (0.65) (0.03) (2.32)** (0.32) (2.04)** 
  Water storage (1=best, 5=worst) 0.217 -0.125 -0.013 -0.445 -0.164 0.514 
 (2.80)*** (1.55) (0.06) (1.88)* (0.70) (1.62) 
  Electricity -0.068 -0.726 1.071 -1.803   
 (0.16) (1.93)* (1.41) (2.31)**   
  Sewage disposal (1=best, 5=worst)   0.181 -0.118   
   (1.03) (0.66)   
Regional dummies       
  Other urban-Hill 0.444 -0.127     
 (1.95)* (0.56)     
  Other urban-Tera 0.036 -0.240     
 (0.12) (0.78)     
  Lima North   0.201 -0.399   
   (0.94) (1.90)*   
  Siera North   0.207 0.503   
   (0.66) (1.75)*   
  Siera Central   0.695 0.259   
   (2.56)** (1.07)   
  Siera South   0.350 0.549   
   (1.36) (2.36)*   
  Selva Alta North   0.120 0.188   
   (0.38) (0.63)   
  Selva Alta Central   0.303 0.294   
   (0.73) (0.93)   
  Selva Alta South   -0.401 0.373   
   (1.31) (1.22)   
  Selva Baja   -0.425 0.704   
   (1.82)* (3.13)***   
  Coastal North   0.246 0.169   
   (1.04) (0.72)   
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 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Schooling 
(2) 
Employment
(3) 
Schooling 
(4) 
Employment 
(5) 
Schooling 
(6) 
Employment
       
  Coastal Central   -0.112 0.662   
   (0.40) (2.67)***   
  Coastal South   0.196 0.326   
   (0.56) (0.99)   
  Bulawayo     -0.041 -0.057 
     (0.23) (0.24) 
  Mashonaland N     -0.099 -0.357 
     (0.45) (1.19) 
  Mashonaland E     0.124 -0.783 
     (0.70) (2.31)** 
  Mashonaland W     -0.063 -0.023 
     (0.36) (0.10) 
  Matabeleland N     0.226 -0.885 
     (0.95) (2.45)** 
  Matabeleland S     0.206 -0.166 
     (0.91) (0.56) 
  Midlands     0.034 -0.870 
     (0.13) (2.33)** 
  Masvingo     0.136 -0.484 
     (0.51) (1.39) 
Constant 1.332 -2.607 4.234 0.151 5.978 -6.280 
 (1.34) (2.80)*** (3.50)*** (0.12) (8.96)*** (7.21)*** 
ρ -0.77 -0.1280 -0.87 
Wald test Χ2(40) = 175.0*** Χ2(58) = 566.8*** Χ2(46) = 385.0*** 
Likelihood ratio test: ρ = 0 Χ2(1) = 78.3*** Χ2(1) = 3.4479* Χ2(1) = 242.6*** 
Observations 700 700 2,203 2,203 3,492 3,492 
Notes:  Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses.  * is significant at 10 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; 
*** is significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 9Joint child and schooling decisions in urban areas, IV estimates 
 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Schooling 
(2) 
Employment
(3) 
Schooling 
(4) 
Employment 
(5) 
Schooling 
(6) 
Employment
       
Sex (female) -0.313 -0.170 -0.273 -0.477 -0.348 0.604 
 (2.43)** (1.23) (2.89)*** (4.78)*** (4.43)*** (5.15)*** 
Age -0.161 0.215 -0.234 0.193 -0.340 0.234 
 (4.98)*** (6.13)*** (9.52)*** (5.26)*** (15.30)*** (9.05)*** 
Child wage 0.097 0.055 0.008 0.225 -0.478 0.682 
 (1.43) (0.90) (0.13) (3.05)*** (1.32) (1.73)* 
Mans wage 0.040 -0.003 -0.030 -0.027 0.342 -3.163 
 (2.90)*** (0.21) (0.54) (0.39) (0.46) (2.79)*** 
Womans wage 0.013 -0.013 -0.072 0.205 -0.189 -4.557 
 (2.24)** (1.75)* (0.75) (1.82)* (0.13) (2.42)** 
Nonwage income (predicted) 0.013 -0.007 -0.814 -0.879 0.029 -0.028 
 (0.15) (0.07) (5.86)*** (1.59) (1.03) (0.75) 
Residuals from first-stage 
regression 
0.016 0.027 -0.252 -0.002 0.000 -0.012 
 (0.32) (0.48) (5.77)*** (0.07) (0.05) (1.93)* 
# Young children  -0.160 0.134 -0.147 -0.069 -0.050 0.123 
 (2.33)** (1.70) (2.65)*** (0.92) (1.09) (2.00)** 
Head sex (female) -0.194 0.106 -0.073 -0.217 -0.306 -0.098 
 (0.92) (0.47) (0.55) (1.35) (2.50)** (0.55) 
Head age -0.166 0.005 0.038 0.074 0.092 -0.128 
 (2.95)*** (0.08) (0.76) (0.76) (2.24)** (2.38)** 
Mans education 0.051 -0.044 -0.087 -0.042 0.008 -0.059 
 (3.24)*** (2.49)** (1.45) (0.76) (0.28) (1.45) 
Womans education 0.053 -0.052 0.048 -0.073 0.082 -0.111 
 (3.13)*** (2.72)*** (0.74) (0.62) (3.25)*** (3.25)*** 
Mother works outside home -0.024 0.362 -0.058 0.446 -0.592 1.033 
 (0.16) (2.24)** (0.53) (3.37)*** (4.44)*** (3.87)*** 
Community-level variables       
  Educational expenses 0.005 -0.005 0.017 0.001 0.221 -0.226 
 (0.73) (0.70) (13.71)*** (0.52) (1.22) (1.03) 
  Access to a bank (1=yes, 0=no) -0.362 -0.166 -0.200 -2.305 -0.074 1.309 
 (1.51) (0.70) (0.22) (2.65)*** (0.16) (2.04)* 
  Number of schools 0.075 -0.039     
 (8.23)*** (4.66)***     
  Water storage (1=best, 5=worst) 0.216 -0.122 -0.159 -0.577 -0.277 0.532 
 (2.78)*** (1.52) (0.65) (2.37)** (1.06) (1.52) 
  Electricity -0.064 -0.759 1.689 -1.466   
 (0.15) (1.99)* (2.14)** (1.71)*   
  Sewage disposal (1=best, 5=worst)   0.434 0.102   
   (2.34)** (0.45)   
Regional dummies       
  Other urban-Hill 0.449 -0.116     
 (1.96)* (0.50)     
  Other urban-Tera 0.037 -0.223     
 (0.12) (0.73)     
  Lima North   0.173 -0.604   
   (0.78) (2.56)*   
  Siera North   0.348 0.335   
   (1.03) (1.12)   
  Siera Central   0.579 0.016   
   (2.06)** (0.06)   
  Siera South   0.506 0.535   
   (1.87)* (2.26)**   
  Selva Alta North   0.027 -0.009   
   (0.09) (0.03)   
  Selva Alta Central   0.396 0.275   
   (0.92) (0.86)   
  Selva Alta South   -0.357 0.215   
   (1.12) (0.68)   
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 (1) 
Schooling 
(2) 
Employment
(3) 
Schooling 
(4) 
Employment 
(5) 
Schooling 
(6) 
Employment
       
  Selva Baja   -0.299 0.755   
   (1.25) (3.24)***   
  Coastal North   0.335 0.102   
   (1.37) (0.42)   
  Coastal Central   -0.192 0.511   
   (0.66) (1.92)*   
  Coastal South   0.624 0.708   
   (1.74)* (1.68)*   
  Bulawayo     0.052 -0.231 
     (0.26) (0.88) 
  Mashonaland N     -0.169 -0.504 
     (0.65) (1.45) 
  Mashonaland E     0.357 -0.929 
     (1.69)* (2.55)** 
  Mashonaland W     -0.192 0.070 
     (0.64) (0.17) 
  Matabeleland N     0.056 -1.008 
     (0.15) (1.90) 
  Matabeleland S     0.141 -0.239 
     (0.58) (0.77) 
  Midlands     -0.123 -1.112 
     (0.30) (1.97)* 
  Masvingo     0.187 -0.467 
     (0.40) (0.80) 
Constant 1.360 -2.637 2.522 -1.604 6.743 -6.685 
 (1.37) (2.83)*** (1.96)* (0.88) (7.99)*** (6.17)*** 
ρ -0.766 -0.160 -0.886 
Wald test Χ2(38) = 175.1*** Χ2(58) = 562.9*** Χ2(48) = 345.7*** 
Likelihood ratio test: ρ = 0 Χ2(1) = 78.5*** Χ2(1) = 4.89* Χ2(1) = 228.0*** 
Exogeneity test for nonwage 
income 
t-statistic = 14.64 
P-value < 0.00001 
t-statistic = 9.42 
P-value < 0.00001 
t-statistic = 3.66 
P-value < 0.0012 
Test for relevance of instrument 
(t-test) 
t-statistic = 14.64 
P-value < 0.00001 
t-statistic = 9.42 
P-value < 0.00001 
t-statistic = 3.66 
P-value < 0.0012 
Observations 701 701 2,170 2,170 3,218 3,218 
Notes:  Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses.  * is significant at 10 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; 
*** is significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 10Child labor supply in rural areas, Tobit estimates 
 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Tobit 
(2) 
IV Tobit 
(3) 
Tobit 
(4) 
IV Tobit 
(5) 
Tobit 
(6) 
IV Tobit 
       
Sex (female) 3.516 3.519 -12.598 -12.598 11.243 11.390 
 (3.29)*** (3.30)*** (8.15)*** (8.05)*** (4.70)*** (4.73)*** 
Age 3.974 3.969 2.812 2.758 14.555 14.537 
 (15.60)*** (15.50)*** (8.17)*** (7.90)*** (18.77)*** (18.74)*** 
Child wage -0.387 -0.386 4.981 6.138 -5.570 -2.717 
 (1.08) (1.08) (1.48) (1.67)* (0.16) (0.08) 
Mans wage -0.132 -0.132 -16.506 -17.123 32.395 33.072 
 (2.48)** (2.48)** (3.28)*** (3.34)*** (1.23) (1.25) 
Womans wage 0.095 0.095 -3.801 -2.902 -134.026 -130.081 
 (1.50) (1.49) (1.23) (0.92) (3.26)*** (3.12)*** 
Nonlabor income -6.373  -2.749  -4.576  
 (4.93)***  (2.15)**  (1.93)*  
Nonwage income (predicted)  -5.757  2.588  0.544 
  (1.65)*  (0.21)  (0.05) 
Residuals from first-stage 
regression 
 -6.455  -2.742  -4.905 
  (4.74)***  (2.13)**  (2.00)** 
# Young children  0.449 0.472 -1.229 -1.010 1.635 1.823 
 (1.00) (1.02) (1.68)* (1.07) (1.71)* (1.78)* 
Head sex (female) 0.418 0.475 0.616 1.265 -4.137 -4.689 
 (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) (0.40) (1.47) (1.56) 
Head age -0.784 -0.795 1.366 1.461 1.201 1.114 
 (1.77)* (1.78)* (1.90)* (2.02)* (1.32) (1.21) 
Mans education -0.762 -0.774 -2.656 -2.260 -2.627 -2.522 
 (5.22)*** (4.86)*** (2.30)** (1.77)* (3.70)*** (3.42)*** 
Womans education -1.157 -1.170 -1.945 -2.562 -4.797 -4.780 
 (4.84)*** (4.70)*** (1.71)* (1.53) (6.00)*** (5.97)*** 
Mother works outside home 3.374 3.404 11.216 12.834 10.861 10.005 
 (1.78)* (1.79)* (4.61)*** (3.57)*** (1.39) (1.26) 
Community-level variables       
  Educational expenses -0.486 -0.496 -12.880 -18.221 -59.989 -62.867 
 (4.19)*** (3.89)*** (0.90) (1.06) (2.61)*** (2.66)*** 
  Access to a bank (yes) -3.258 -3.297 70.519 73.559 -25.110 -25.694 
 (1.97)* (1.97)* (3.03)*** (3.00)*** (3.56)*** (3.59)*** 
  Number of schools -0.718 -0.723     
 (3.91)*** (3.91)***     
  Water storage (1=best, 5=worst) 2.789 2.772 -3.400 -3.795 3.772 3.672 
 (3.43)*** (3.39)*** (1.07) (1.18) (1.08) (1.05) 
  Electricity -3.815 -3.833 -29.817 -29.633   
 (2.51)** (2.52)* (3.06)*** (3.00)***   
  Sewage disposal (1=best, 5=worst)   2.495 2.388   
   (3.78)*** (3.59)***   
Regional dummies       
  Rural West-Hill 5.308 5.318     
 (3.27)*** (3.27)***     
  Rural East-Hill 4.976 4.859     
 (2.83)*** (2.61)***     
  Rural West Tera 5.048 5.074     
 (2.61)*** (2.62)***     
  Siera North   -1.747 0.641   
   (0.66) (0.11)   
  Siera Central   7.043 6.872   
   (3.14)*** (3.03)***   
  Selva Alta North   -6.445 -6.513   
   (1.76)* (1.77)*   
  Selva Alta South   -12.380 -9.376   
   (2.06)** (1.05)   
  Selva Baja   6.390 6.581   
   (2.56)** (2.62)***   
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 (1) 
Tobit 
(2) 
IV Tobit 
(3) 
Tobit 
(4) 
IV Tobit 
(5) 
Tobit 
(6) 
IV Tobit 
       
  Coastal North   -8.179 -5.445   
   (2.42)** (0.91)   
  Coastal South   -20.402 -22.800   
   (2.05)** (2.00)*   
  Mashonaland N     6.337 5.981 
     (1.35) (1.26) 
  Mashonaland E     -1.510 -1.594 
     (0.27) (0.29) 
  Mashonaland W     -24.118 -24.755 
     (4.09)*** (4.11)*** 
  Matabeleland N     8.532 8.566 
     (1.41) (1.42) 
  Matabeleland S     16.147 16.616 
     (3.02)*** (3.06)*** 
  Midlands     -2.893 -3.290 
     (0.68) (0.76) 
  Masvingo     9.209 9.421 
     (2.09)** (2.13)** 
Constant -51.614 -51.669 -18.781 -20.547 -286.284 -286.162 
 (7.74)*** (7.74)*** (1.03) (1.07) (12.91)*** (12.90)*** 
Likelihood ratio test X2(21) = 
545.6*** 
X2(20) = 
527*** 
X2(24) = 
290.8*** 
X2(25) = 
287.9*** 
X2(22) = 
877.0*** 
X2(23) = 
877.3*** 
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.037 0.04 0.039 0.089 0.099 
Observations 2,876 2,876 1,395 1,387 8,654 8,654 
Notes:  Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses.  * is significant at 10 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; 
*** is significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 11Child labor supply in urban areas, Tobit estimates 
 Nepal Peru Zimbabwe 
 (1) 
Tobit 
(2) 
IV Tobit 
(3) 
Tobit 
(4) 
IV Tobit 
(5) 
Tobit 
(6) 
IV Tobit 
       
Sex (female) -4.988 -5.068 -14.279 -17.754 30.488 30.960 
 (1.01) (1.03) (5.03)*** (4.97)*** (1.73) (1.76) 
Age 7.434 7.447 5.733 7.185 22.870 22.913 
 (5.49)*** (5.49)*** (8.41)*** (5.42)*** (3.57)*** (3.61)*** 
Child wage -0.481 -0.496 4.800 6.891 156.900 153.625 
 (0.23) (0.23) (2.22)** (2.66)*** (2.04)** (2.02)** 
Mans wage -0.194 -0.195 -2.850 -0.703 -79.338 -147.221 
 (0.40) (0.40) (1.45) (0.29) (0.38) (0.68) 
Womans wage -0.319 -0.318 1.980 5.832 -133.829 -126.994 
 (1.23) (1.23) (0.64) (1.48) (0.44) (0.41) 
Nonwage income -0.318  -0.488  -6.134  
 (0.16)  (0.64)  (1.47)  
Nonwage income (predicted)  0.191  -28.672  -45.270 
  (0.05)  (1.47)  (1.24) 
Residuals from first-stage 
regression 
 -0.463  -0.301  -5.248 
  (0.21)  (0.33)  (1.24) 
# Young children  2.887 2.927 0.190 -2.748 8.107 13.002 
 (1.09) (1.10) (0.12) (1.05) (0.94) (1.31) 
Head sex (female) 10.469 10.688 -2.227 -8.731 13.604 38.701 
 (1.25) (1.26) (0.60) (1.56) (0.57) (1.16) 
Head age -0.036 -0.096 -2.104 2.689 -8.344 -4.546 
 (0.02) (0.04) (1.55) (0.79) (1.09) (0.55) 
Mans education -1.659 -1.680 -0.937 -1.825 -6.871 -12.434 
 (2.69)*** (2.67)*** (0.55) (0.95) (1.35) (1.68)* 
Womans education -1.966 -2.001 -8.488 -2.509 -12.310 -15.975 
 (2.93)*** (2.85)*** (4.76)*** (0.61) (2.12)** (2.29)** 
Mother works outside home (yes) 10.107 10.234 18.151 12.198 87.491 82.594 
 (1.72)* (1.73)* (4.86)*** (2.63)*** (2.15)** (2.05)** 
Community-level variables       
  Educational expenses -0.270 -0.290 -0.060 0.008 76.688 84.990 
 (1.09) (1.06) (3.11)*** (0.16) (1.38) (1.50) 
  Access to a bank (yes) -0.387 -0.132 -54.749 -64.245 105.569 99.317 
 (0.04) (0.01) (1.88) (2.15)** (1.25) (1.18) 
  Water storage (1=best, 5=worst) -4.569 -4.587 -12.419 -16.524 35.917 22.850 
 (1.56) (1.57) (1.47) (1.93) (0.69) (0.43) 
  Electricity -18.572 -18.212 -59.921 -49.806   
 (1.41) (1.37) (2.16)** (1.67)   
  Sewage disposal (1=best, 5=worst)   -6.298 0.384   
   (0.96) (0.05)   
Regional dummies       
  Other Urban-Hill -2.909 -3.153     
 (0.36) (0.39)     
  Other Urban-Tera -5.871 -6.057     
 (0.55) (0.57)     
  Lima North   -15.098 -22.016   
   (2.02)** (2.67)***   
  Siera North   14.326 8.409   
   (1.39) (0.80)   
  Siera Central   7.420 -1.233   
   (0.86) (0.13)   
  Siera South   14.300 13.025   
   (1.71)* (1.57)   
  Selva Alta North   6.827 -0.009   
   (0.65) (0.00)   
  Selva Alta Central   9.879 8.776   
   (0.87) (0.79)   
  Selva Alta South   12.885 7.701   
   (1.19) (0.70)   
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 (1) 
Tobit 
(2) 
IV Tobit 
(3) 
Tobit 
(4) 
IV Tobit 
(5) 
Tobit 
(6) 
IV Tobit 
       
  Selva Baja   20.910 21.734   
   (2.59)*** (2.66)***   
  Coastal North   7.517 3.073   
   (0.92) (0.37)   
  Coastal Central   21.079 15.260   
   (2.38)** (1.65)*   
  Coastal South   4.507 16.100   
   (0.38) (1.08)   
  Bulawayo     2.983 -7.281 
     (0.07) (0.18) 
  Mashonaland N     30.468 11.931 
     (0.64) (0.24) 
  Mashonaland E     -12.518 -18.835 
     (0.33) (0.48) 
  Mashonaland W     -89.900 -90.869 
     (1.06) (1.06) 
  Matabeleland N     -47.859 -62.251 
     (0.92) (1.16) 
  Matabeleland S     42.767 11.443 
     (1.04) (0.23) 
  Midlands     -36.927 -52.831 
     (0.64) (0.89) 
  Masvingo     -113.551 -137.787 
     (1.63) (1.86)* 
Constant -83.446 -84.227 -14.304 0.902 -654.146 -682.860 
 (2.46)* (2.42)* (0.32) (0.02) (3.38)*** (3.46)*** 
Likelihood ratio test X2(18) = 
115.8*** 
X2(19) = 
115.4*** 
X2(28) = 
263.3*** 
X2(29) = 
261.2*** 
X2(23) = 
67.2*** 
X2(24) = 
74.1*** 
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.087 0.070 0.070 0.119 0.131 
Observations 692 692 2,203 2,170 3,218 3,218 
Notes:  Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses.  * is significant at 10 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; 
*** is significant at 1 percent. 
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